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"INDECENT" LANGUAGE: A NEW CLASS OF PROHIBITABLE
SPEECH? FCC V. PACIFICA FOUNDATION
Owing to its physical characteristics radio, unlike the other methods of con-
veying information, must be regulated and rationed by the government
.... But because of its vast potentialities as a medium of communication,
discussion and propaganda, the character and extent of control that should
be exercised over it by the government is a matter of deep and vital concern
.... It may even be an instrument of oppression.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in this country have long recognized that the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech, while written in absolute terms,2 is not an
unyielding bar to all government regulation.3 The basic question left unre-
solved, however, is under what circumstances the government may inter-
vene on behalf of itself or its citizens to place restrictions upon the great
protected right of communication.4 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States,5 indicated that the question
was whether the words used would create a "clear and present danger" of
bringing about "substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."6
Inherent in this philosophy was a balancing model which the Court still
utilizes today. Under this model, constitutionally protected expression
may be regulated only upon a showing by the government that a compel-
ling, countervailing interest so dictates.'
However, the Supreme Court has also recognized an area of communica-
tion for which there exists no constitutional protection., This approach,
which one commentator has referred to as a "two-level theory of free
1. National Broaeiasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 228 (1943)(Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
2. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3. "[Tihe character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
(Citation omitted]. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre. . ." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
4. See generally Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 761 (1970).
5. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6. Id. at 52.
7. See, e.g.,*Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
8. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or "fighting" words .... [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas ....
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-2 (1942).
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speech,"' is premised on the belief that certain classes of communication
have no value and may thus be prohibited entirely.'" Within this area fall
"fighting words," which the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire" de-
fined as, "those [words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. ... ,1 While purporting
to apply an objective standard-that which would cause an "average ad-
dressee" to fight' 3-the Court upheld the appellant's conviction for refer-
ring to a city marshall as "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned
Fascist."' 4 While certain language in Chaplinsky, if not the decision itself,
would tend to support the proposition that words could be proscribed if
harmful to the sensibilities of others, subsequent decisions by the Court
made it clear that this was not so.' 5 Rather, it was held that offensive
speech was proscribable only when it threatened the single, tightly drawn
interest in preventing a violent response by an average addressee.'6
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation," the Supreme Court found itself once
again grappling with the problems of offensive words. Thi; time, however,
the words were spoken over the airwaves rather than on the city streets,
and it was this factor that the Court found particularly significant. Citing
the "uniquely pervasive presence" of the broadcast medium,'8 a majority
of the Court" voiced its concern that offensive material could be indiscri-
minately carried by radio waves-thus assaulting children and unwilling
adults, and invading the privacy of the home.2 0 In light of these important
interests, the Court upheld a Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
order2 ' which determined that certain "indecent" words are proscribable
in the broadcast medium, even though they would be constitutionally
9. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10.
10. "[The] common ground of prohibited speech would include the direct advocacy of
serious criminal action, contempt of court, libel, invasions of privacy, and above all obscen-
ity." Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 33
(1967).
11. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
12. Id. at 572.
13. Id. at 573.
14. Id. at 574.
15. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Papish v. Board of Curators,
410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
16. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 1, 27 (1974).
17. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
18. Id. at 3040.
19. Justices Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall dissented.
20. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
21. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
[Vol. 13:297
7C INDECENT" LANGUAGE
protected elsewhere. 2 The decision is startling, not merely because the
Court appears to have adopted yet another class of prohibitable speech,
but because it portends the ominous consequences of a government dictat-
ing what words we shall, or shall not, hear.
I1. FAcTS
In the early afternoon of October 30, 1973, radio station WBAI-FM, New
York, New York, a Pacifica Foundation affiliate, broadcast a twelve-
minute segment from the album, "George Carlin, Occupation: Foole." ' 3
The monologue was titled "Filthy Words," and consisted of a comedy
routine almost entirely devoted to the repetition of seven "words you
couldn't say on the public . . . air waves .. "24
In response to a listener's complaint,2 the FCC handed down a declara-
tory order26 which held that the seven words contained in the Carlin mono-
logue were prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970)2 which proscribes the use
of "obscene, indecent, or profane language" in radio broadcasts. Conceding
that the Carlin monologue was not obscene,2 the FCC nevertheless deter-
22. "Some uses of even the most offensive words are unquestionably protected. [citation
omitted] Indeed, we may assume, arguendo, that [these words] would be protected in other
contexts . . . . It is a characteristic of speech such as this that both its capacity to offend
and its 'social value'. . . vary with the circumstances." 98 S. Ct. at 3039 (footnote omitted).
23. The segment was broadcast as a portion of a regularly scheduled live program,
"Lunchpail," which was hosted by an employee of WBAI. The October 30, 1973 broadcast
consisted of an "analysis of contemporary society's attitudes toward language." 56 F.C.C.2d
at 95.
24. The words were "shit," "piss," "fuck," "cunt," "cocksucker," "motherfucker," and
"tits." A transcript of the monologue may be found in the appendix of the Supreme Court's
decision. 98 S. Ct. at 3041-3.
25. On December 3, 1973, the FCC received a complaint from a man in New York City
who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving in his car with his young son. In
accordance with its policies, the FCC forwarded the complaint to radio station WBAI-FM
with a request for its comments. In its response, Pacifica likened George Carlin to such
significant social satirists as Mark Twain and Mort Sahl, and stated that Carlin was "merely
using words to satirize [how] harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words
[are]." 56 F.C.C.2d at 96. However, Pacifica indicated that, having recognized the sensitive
nature of the Carlin monologue, the WBAI commentator had advised listeners who might be
offended, to change the station and return to WBAI in 15 minutes. Id.
26. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than two years or both."
28. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), the Court indicated that obscenity
was to be found according to "whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Similarly, in the Court's latest effort to define "obscenity," one of the basic guide-
lines set forth was, "whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
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mined that it was "indecent." 9 Recognizing that indecent speech, unlike
obscenity, is not wholly proscribable, the Commission spoke in terms of
channeling such speech into the late evening hours when fewer children
would be in the listening audience.3 1 Cognizant that the term "indecent"
had never been authoritatively construed by the courts in connection with
section 1464, the FCC imposed no sanctions on Pacifica Foundation. It did,
however, place the order in Pacifica's license file to be considered upon the
receipt of any subsequent complaints.3'
Pacifica Foundation appealed the FCC's ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. The federal court reversed the FCC
ruling in a 2-1 decision 32 in which each of the three judges wrote an opin-
ion.m On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the federal
dards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest .... "
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Consequently, the Commission has recognized
that words lacking such an erotic appeal are not "obscene" within the meaning of section
1464. For a history of the Supreme Court's efforts to define "obscenity," see generally, Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114 (Brennan, J., dissenting); F. SCHAUER, THE
LAw OF OBscEN'rry (1976).
29. The FCC has taken the position that the terms "indecent" and "obscene" refer to two
different things. See, e.g., Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970); Jack Straw Memorial
Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, affd on rehearing, 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970). As reformulated by
the Commission, the concept of "indecent" is "intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 56
F.C.C.2d at 98.
30. "[D]uring the late evening hours such words conceivably might be broadcast, with
sufficient warning to unconsenting adults provided the programs in which they are used have
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." 56 F.C.C.2d at 100. The FCC recognized
that the regulatory scheme it was espousing would be impermissible in other media. Four
considerations were listed which, it was felt, necessitated giving the broadcast medium spe-
cial treatment: (1) children, often without parental supervision, have access to radios; (2)
radio receivors are located in the home, where privacy interests are given greater deference;
(3) an audience may consist of unwilling adult listeners; and (4) a scarcity of spectrum space,
the use of which must be licensed by the government in the public interest. Id. at 97.
31. Id. at 99. In addition to 18.U.S.C. § 1464, the FCC justified its declaratory order on
the basis of 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) which provides that the Commission shal "generally encour-
age the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." Id.
32. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
33. In the view of Judge Tamm, the FCC's ruling was overbroad and constituted censorship
in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) which provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station. ... In a concurring opinion,
Chief Judge Bazelon, while agreeing that the FCC had censored, did not agree that section
326 was dispositive. That section, he believed, could not protect speech which was otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution. In examining the first amendment implications of the
Commission's actions, Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that the Commission had both disre-
[Vol. 13:297300
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circuit court decision. Adopting the position taken by dissenting Circuit
Judge Leventhal, the Court purported to limit its judicial review to the
Commission's determination that the monologue, as broadcast, was
"indecent" within the meaning of section 1464.31 So limited, the Court
determined that the Commission's actions were congressionally mandated,
and did not constitute impermissible censorship.Y Additionally, the Court
adopted the FCC's position that the terms "obscene" and "indecent" have
separate meanings within the context of section 1464, and that the Carlin
monologue could be proscribed even though it was not obscene.-"
Because of the tremendous, potential impact that the Pacifica decision
has on the broadcast medium, it is important to examine the holding
carefully. Does it comport with previous Supreme Court doctrine, or is it,
in fact, an aberration?
I. ANALYSi
Although the Supreme Court purported to limit its judicial review to the
Commission's determination that the monologue, as broadcast, was inde-
cent, it is clear that the scope of the FCC's order is much broader. The
Commission itself characterized its declaratory order as a "clariflication
of] the standards which will be utilized in considering the public's com-
plaints about the broadcast of 'indecent' language." 37 Thus, "[i]nstead of
merely considering the words 'as broadcast' "by WBAI-FM, "the Commis-
sion adopted a legislative-type rule which it then applied to the facts of
the case." 3 To hold, as did the Court, that the FCC did not engage in the
"promulgation of any regulations," 39 is to ignore the "nature of the beast."
The FCC, as the agency charged with overseeing the broadcast industry,
has been given wide regulatory power which it has readily exercised. While
an in-depth analysis of FCC control of programming is beyond the scope
of this comment, the seeming incongruity of government regulation in an
garded and misread Supreme Court precedent in the area. In dissent, Judge Leventhal was
supportive of the FCC ruling which he viewed as narrowly holding "only 'that the language
as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464.'" 556 F.2d at 31 (Leven-
thal, J., dissenting).
34. 98 S. Ct. at 3033.
35. Id. at 3035.
36. Id. at 3036.
37. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 (emphasis added). Additionally, in its Report on the Broadcast of
Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 425 (1975), the Commission ex-
pressed its hope that the "effects on the declaratory order . . . will clarify the broadcast
standards for obscene and indecent speech. . . and will prove effective in abating the prob-
lems ...."
38. 556 F.2d at 19 n.2 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
39. 98 S. Ct. at 3032.
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area of first amendment concerns has been noted," and will be considered
briefly here.
The FCC believes that, due to the special nature of the broadcast me-
dium, it must be regulated for the whole public.' Consequently, it admin-
isters sanctions for programming which does not fall within its conception
of the "public interest."42 The Commission argues that this does not consti-
tute censorship because it does not impose prior restraints, 3 but the prac-
40. See generally Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L.
& EcoN. 15 (1967); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years
of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967); Note, Regulation of Program
Content by the FCC, 77 HARy. L. REv. 701 (1964); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First
Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579 (1975); Note, Morality and
the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HRv. L.
Rav. 664 (1971); Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343 (1970).
41. Prior to 1927, the allocation of radio frequencies was left entirely to the private sector.
The result was a chaotic "cacaphony [sic] of competing voices, none of which could be...
heard." Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). It became apparent
that radio frequencies were a scarce resource which required government regulation. Conse-
quently, in 1927, Congress passed the Radio Act which created the Federal Radio Commission
and endowed it with wide licensing and regulatory powers. The Commission's powers were
not limited to technical aspects of regulation, however, but also included the task of choosing
from among the many applicants who applied for radio licenses. Licenses were to be allocated
in a manner responsible to the public "convenience, interest, or necessity." Id. at 377. Today
the FCC, which evolved from the Federal Radio Commission, has been given a similar con-
gressional mandate under 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970) which provides: "ITihe Commission from
time to time, as public convenience, interest or necessity requires, shall . . .(g) Study new
uses for radio . . . and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the
public interest."
42. See, e.g., Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919, on reconsideration, 41
F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(forfeiture assessed for broadcast of obscenity);
Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970)(forfeiture assessed for broadcast of indecent
language); Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, aff'd on rehearing, 24
F.C.C.2d 266 (1970)(short-term renewal of license required due to lack of licensee control over
profane or indecent language in broadcast); Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964)(scru-
tiny by FCC of five specific broadcasts); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962),
aff'd sub nom, Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843
(1964)(licensee's application for renewal of license denied due to (1) misrepresentations and
false statements made to FCC, and (2) broadcast of material which was "coarse, vulgar,
suggestive, and susceptible of indecent, double meaning." The federal court affirmed on the
first ground only.); Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960) (cease and desist order
issued for broadcast of offensive remarks and sound effects); WREC Broadcasting Service,
19 F.C.C. 1082 (1954) (applicant was granted a license to establish a television station, in part,
because competing applicant's radio station had played six songs which were "vulgar and
subject to double meaning").
43. The Commission has adopted Zechariah Chafee's narrow position that, "[prohibited
censorship] means. . . the sort of censorship which went on in the seventeenth century in
England-the deletion of specific items and dictation as to what should go into particular
[Vol. 13:297
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tice is, nevertheless, a powerful censorial influence. Under the "public
interest theory," the Commission is able to penalize a wide variety of
speech which would be fully protected in other media." Indeed, as one
commentator has observed, the Commission merely treats the first amend-
ment as an "interesting parallel development in other media." 5 First
amendment rights of broadcasters are seen as only one factor to be consid-
ered in arrivng at a public interest determination. And, in fact, those rights
may be ignored if they interfere with the Commission's attempts to im-
prove broadcasting for the whole public."
While much of the FCC's attempts to control programming can only,
realistically, be viewed as censorship, it does not necessarily follow that the
Commission's Pacifica order is censorial. Because the FCC has been
given authority to enforce the section 1464 ban against broadcasting
"obscene, indecent, or profane language,"4 the clear implication is that
speech receiving no protection under the first amendment will receive no
greater protection under the statutory prohibition of FCC regulations. It
thus remains to be seen whether the Carlin monologue would be protected
in other media and, if so, whether it may nevertheless be regulated, when
broadcast, due to the "unique character" of the medium.48
There are a few decisions which have established the power of govern-
ment to prohibit certain forms of expression simply upon a showing that
such a form was employed. Within this area fall "fighting words" and
obscenity. With its decision in Pacifica, the Court has seemingly added
"indecent" language as yet another category of speech that may be prohib-
ited." Interestingly, the Court cited no judicial precedent for its position.
programs." Z. CHAFEE, 2 GovERNmErr AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 641 (1947) quoted in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3033 n.9.
44. "[W]e all take as commonplace a degree of government surveillance for broadcasting
which would by instant reflex ignite the fiercest protest were it found in other areas of
communication." Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. &
EcoN. 15, 16 (1967).
45. Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343, 1346 (1970).
46. Id. at 1347.
47. Both 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 and 503(b)(1)(E)(1970) explicitly provide sanctions for the
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464(1970).
48. 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
49. While it is true that the Commission spoke of "channeling" indecent words into the
late evening hours rather than of prohibiting them entirely, it was said that this could be done
"provided the programs in which they are used have serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value." 56 F.C.C.2d at 100. Consequently, the Carlin monologue, which would likely
be characterized as entertainment, could be totally banned under the FCC order.
50. Although in a footnote, 98 S. Ct. at 3036 n.16, the Court cited several administrative
rulings by the FCC, only one-WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970)-supported the position
that "indecent" and "obscene" have different meanings. That decision was not appealed to
a judicial tribunal.
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Rather, it seemed to rely primarily on a reading of the plain language of
section 1464 and noted that, "the words 'obscene, indecent, or profane' are
written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning.""
This conclusion, however, ignores precedent. Section 1464 may be found
in the United States Code in Title 18, along with four other sections in
Chapter 71 entitled "Obscenity." Each of these sections employ the term
"indecent" along with other adjectives, including "obscene," and yet each
of these other sections has been authoritatively construed by the courts to
prohibit only that which is "obscene." 5
While the Supreme Court cited no cases in support of its interpretation
of section 1464, the Commission did refer to three federal appellate court
decisions which appeared open to adoption of the Government's position
that the terms "indecent" and "obscene" were not synonymous. How-
ever, in 1977, the Seventh Circuit held that " 'obscene' and 'indecent' in §
1464 are to be read as parts of a single proscription, applicable only if the
challenged language appeals to the prurient interest."'" Thus, prior to the
Pacifica decision, no court had adopted the FCC's position that it could
proscribe "indecent" language.
To support its theory that non-obscene language could be regulated as
a nuisance, the Commission cited Williams v. District of Columbia.5 Wil-
liams, the manager of a laundromat, had refused to move on from the
sidewalk in front of his establishment when requested to do so by the
police. After daring the officers to lock his "God damn ass up," and calling
one of them a "son of a bitch," Williams was arrested for the use in public
streets of "profane language, indecent and obscene words." 5 The federal
court held that the ordinance would be valid only if interpreted to apply
to those narrow circumstances in which the language threatened a breach
of the peace. The court indicated that a breach might be threatened
"either because the language creates a substantial risk of provoking viol-
ence, or because it is, under 'contemporary community standards,' so
grossly offensive to members of the public who actually overhear it as to
51. 98 S. Ct. at 3035.
52. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "We would ordinarily expect a word
found in each of five sections comprising a chapter of the United States Code to mean the
same thing wherever it appears in the chapter." United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 56
(7th Cir. 1977).
53. United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972); Tallman v. United States, 465
F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).
54. United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 60 (1977).
55. 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(en banc).
56. 22 D.C. CODE § 1107 (1967), noted in, Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d at
[Vol. 13:297
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amount to a nuisance." 7 This second prong of the Williams test appears
to support the FCC's position. However, the current validity of Williams
is highly questionable in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions
involving offensive language.
In Cohen v. California,8 the appellant had walked down a corridor of a
Los Angeles courthouse with the words, "Fuck the Draft," inscribed upon
his jacket. He was arrested and subsequently convicted under § 415 of the
California Penal Code which prohibited "maliciously and willfully
disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person. . . by...
offensive conduct." The Court overturned Cohen's conviction and found
the California statute unconstitutionally overbroad because it proscribed
language which did not fall within the recognized categories of prohibitable
speech." In Cohen, the Court finally rejected the argument that public
discourse could be regulated in the interest of protecting the sensibilities
of listeners." It noted that words have an emotive, as well as cognitive,
function, and that the former may often be the more important in convey-
ing a particular message. In order to constitutionally shut off discourse, the
Court held that the government must show that "substantial privacy inter-
ests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."'" California
had not made that showing in Cohen because persons confronted with
Cohen's jacket could have simply averted their eyes.6"
The year after the Cohen decision, the Court in Gooding v. Wilson,63
struck down a portion of the Georgia Code which held that, "[a]ny person
who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence
• . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of
the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The statute was found
to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it was not limited to the prohi-
bition of "fighting words." An interest in protecting the sensibilities of
others was quickly dismissed.64 During the same term, three other cases
were vacated and remanded in light of the Cohen and Gooding decisions.,5
57. Id. at 646.
58. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
59. Cohen's expression, having no erotic appeal, was not obscene. And, as it was clearly
not "directed to the person of the hearer" in a "personally provocative fashion" likely to
provoke violent reaction, Cohen's expression could not be categorized as "fighting words."
Id. at 20.
60. "[Ihe State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammati-
cally palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general princi-
ple exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below." Id. at 25.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id.
63. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
64. Id. at 527.
65. In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), the appellant, while addressing a
1979] 305
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Consequently, it would appear that the FCC's reliance upon the second
prong of the Williams test is unsound. At least in public discourse, the
sensibilities of listeners cannot justify the suppression of offensive words.
The FCC argued, however, that the unique characteristic of the broad-
cast medium justifies a greater degree of regulation. Radio waves, the
argument goes, invade the privacy of the home. As noted previously, how-
ever, permissible intervention by the government to protect "substantial
privacy rights" is made dependent upon a showing thai. they are being
"invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.""6
First it must be determined whether or not a "substantial privacy right"
is really in issue. It is true that the Court has recognized that citizens have
a particular right to privacy in the home,67 and certainly radios are com-
monly found in the home. But radio programs do not enter the home
uninvited as do the raucous noises emanating from sound trucks. 8 Rather,
one must choose to admit radio programs into the home by the affirmative
action of turning a dial. Because the airwaves are a public medium, one
who chooses to turn on his radio is as effectively entering the public as does
one who walks out into the street. 9 Consequently, it may be argued that
the Commission's privacy-of-the-home argument for regulating offensive
speech is ill-founded.
Assuming, however, that a "substantial privacy interest" is involved,
does the broadcasting of offensive words constitute an "intolerable inva-
school board meeting which included women and children, used the term "motherfucker"
four times. His conviction for the use of offensive language was vacated and remanded in light
of Cohen and Gooding. In Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972), the appellant had been
arrested and convicted following his use of the term "motherfucker" while giving the Black
Panther viewpoint on a university campus. The conviction, similarly, was vacated and re-
manded in light of Cohen and Gooding. In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972),
the appellant's conviction for calling a policeman a "goddamn motherfucker" was vacated
in light of Gooding. Significantly, while Justice Powell concurred in the Court's disposition
of the case, the other three Nixon appointees-Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger-dissented. Burger cited Williams in support of his view that offensive speech
could be prohibited to protect the sensibilities of others. On remand, the Louisiana Supreme
Court upheld Lewis' conviction for the use of "obscene or opprobious language." Thereupon,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and struck down the ordinance for overbreadth in
light of Gooding and Chaplinsky. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
66. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21.
67. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
68. The Court in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), upheld a Trenton, New Jersey
ordinance which outlawed the use of sound trucks. But see Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948), in which the Court held that an ordinance forbidding sound amplification except by
permission of the chief of police was an unconstitutional prior restraint.
69. Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast
Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579, 618 (1975).
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sion"? The Court in Cohen held that the appellant's form of expression did
not constitute an "intolerable invasion" because unwilling viewers could
simply avert their eyes.7" Similarly, it may be said that an offensive pro-
gram may be simply changed or turned off.7 In Rowan v. Post Office
Department,72 the Court, in upholding a scheme which allowed offended
householders to remove their names from mailing lists, said that "[t]o
hold less . . . would make hardly more sense than to say that a radio or
television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive. . . commu-
nication and thus bar its entering his home." 3 Although the majority of
the Court in Pacifica did not believe that turning off the radio was an
acceptable method for dealing with offensive broadcasts,74 it would appear
to be more consonant with first amendment ideals than total prohibition.
Indeed, "in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance
of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege . . . fundamental- societal
values are truly implicated. 71 5
As further justification for regulating "indecent" speech, the Commis-
sion cited the presence of children in the listening audience. That this
concern for children is also shared by the Supreme Court was indicated in
Jacobellis v. Ohio,7" when Mr. Justice Brennan observed that: "We recog-
nize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and localities
throughout the Nation in preventing the dissemination of material deemed
harmful to children. '7 But, as the Court had noted previously, the interest
in shielding children from harmful material does not justify a total sup-
pression of otherwise constitutionally protected expression.7 8 Subse-
70. 403 U.S. at 21.
71. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), the Court reversed a
lower court decision which had held that radio broadcasts on a public transit system violated
constitutional guarantees. In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas argued that, "[o]ne who tunes in
on an offensive program at home can turn it off or tune in another station, as he wishes....
But the man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit and listen . . . ." 343 U.S. at 469
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932), the Court upheld the
validity of a statute which banned cigarette and tobacco ads from billboards and streetcar
signs because of their intrusiveness. The Court noted that, "people ... have the message of
the billboard thrust upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can produce .... The
radio can be turned off, but not so the billboard or street car placard." 285 U.S. at 110.
72. 397 U:S. 728 (1970).
73. Id. at 737.
74. "To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears
indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow." 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
75. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 25.
76. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
77. Id. at 195.
78. In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
Court, noted that total suppression of material deemed harmful to bhildren would have the
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quently, in Ginsberg v. New York, 9 the Court upheld the validity of a
statutory scheme which provided for the application of a modified obscen-
ity test to situations in which minors were exposed to such material. It is
important to note, however, that the statute in Ginsberg still required a
finding of obscenity; that is, it still required an appeal to prurient interest,
still required patent offensiveness, and still required a lack of redeeming
social value. 0 Material lacking any one of those three factors would receive
constitutional protection.
Although both the FCC and the Supreme Court cited Ginsberg in sup-
port of the FCC's declaratory order, it would appear that that decision
should dictate the order's invalidation.' The FCC's definition of
"indecent" lacks Ginsberg's requirement of prurient appeal.2 Further-
more, the FCC would prohibit "indecent" speech at times of the day when
children may be in the audience, even though the broadcast might have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value -a -violation of the
Ginsberg principle. And, finally, the FCC order would not require the
essential finding of patent offensiveness to children.84
The mere pretense of shielding children from harmful material will not
validate an otherwise impermissible statutory scheme. The Court scruti-
nized just such a scheme in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville," and found
it lacking. At issue in Erznoznik was a local ordinance which made it a
public nuisance, and a punishable offense, for drive-in movie theaters to
exhibit films containing nudity if the screen was visible from a public
street or place. The ordinance was unconstitutional, the Court held, be-
cause it effectively deterred the showing of "movies containing any nudity,
however innocent or even educational." 8 The FCC order is similarly over-
effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population to reading only what is fit for children." 352
U.S. at 383.
79. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
80. Id. at 633.
81. Note, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: First Amendment Limitations gn FCC Regulation
of Offensive Broadcasts, 56 N.C.L. REv. 585, 594 (1978).
82. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
83. Id.
84. The FCC would judge patent offensiveness by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium. That approach would not only appear to violate the Ginsberg holding,
that material which is believed to be obscene to minors must first be determined to be
patently offensive to minors, but would appear to be unconstitutionally overbroad as well.
Appellant's dismissal from school in Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per
curiam), was held to be an impermissible violation of the first amendment, even though her
use, in a student newspaper, of the word "motherfucker" and of a cartoon showing the
Statutes of Liberty and Justice being raped by policemen, could have been held to be
"patently offensive by contemporary community standards for the newspaper medium."
85. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
86. Id. at 211.
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broad, in that it deters the broadcast of offensive words even in an innocent
or educational context.Y The problem is exacerbated, however, by the
FCC's use of the term "indecent" which is inherently vague, even as de-
fined by the Commission.8
The Court did uphold a regulatory scheme in Young v. American Mini
Theatres," but it lacked many of the infirmities present in Erznoznik and
the FCC's order. At issue in Young was Detroit's Anti-Skid Row Ordinance
which restricted certain "adult" establishments from locating within 1000
feet of each other. The ordinance was enacted to protect the present and
future character of Detroit's neighborhoods, but challengers claimed that
it constituted a violation of their freedom of speech. The Court upheld the
ordinance, however, noting that the 1000-foot restriction did not create an
impermissible restraint on protected communication." As Mr. Justice
Powell noted in a concurring opinion, "Detroit has silenced no message,
has invoked no censorship, and has imposed no limitation upon those who
wish to view [adult movies] ..... [There is no] significant overall cur-
tailment of. . . the opportunity for a message to reach an audience."'
By contrast, the FCC's declaratory order would significantly restrain
protected communication. The channeling of programs into the late eve-
ning hours because of offensive language, would not only deny access to
adults who go to bed at an earlier hour, but would preclude their being
broadcast on nearly one-half of the nation's AM stations which operate
only during the daytime.92 Furthermore, the Court's holding that the Car-
lin monologue might be protected "in other contexts,"9 is premised on the
assumption that willing listeners will have access to those other contexts.
87. As Mr. Justice Brennan noted,
[The FCC's order could] justify the banning from radio of a myriad of literary works,
novels, poems, and plays by the likes of Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway, Ben Jonson,
Henry Fielding, Robert Bums, and Chaucer; they could support the suppression of a
good deal of political speech, such as the Nixon tapes; and they could even provide
the basis for imposing sanctions for the broadcast of certain portions of the Bible.
98 S. Ct. at 3051-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
88. If a list of all the words which either offend the majority-or which they think
will offend too many of the public-were ever published as banned from the air, that
would clearly be [prohibited] prior censorship .... But failure to publish the list
may have even more chilling effect upon broadcast programming, because licensees
may avoid the use of many, many more words out of fear that they may be on the
Commission's secret list.
Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, 838 (1970)(C6x, Comm., dissenting).
89. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
90. Id. at 62.
91. Id. 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Amicus curiae, Committee for Open Media, San Francisco Chapter, as noted in, Paci-
fica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 20 n.5 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
93. 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
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For many, however, nightclub performances and phonograph albums may
constitute an unaffordable luxury.94
The most disturbing aspect of the Pacifica decision is the majoritarian-
ism upon which it appears to rest. While most aspects of our political
system are based on majoritarianism, certain freedoms, such as freedoms
of speech, press, and religion, were felt to be too important to be left to
the "vagaries of majority vote.""5 Yet the Court is willing to,
[grant deference] to the sensibilities ... of the prevalent groups in society
who happen to find. . . certain kinds. . . of words deeply repulsive, while
[showing] no comparable concern ... for minorities who may have no
"hang-ups" about those particular [words], but who may be just as deeply
offended by different . . . stimuli which few would seriously propose to ex-
clude from the public forum. 8
The Court, for instance, would not likely support a ban of religious broad-
casts because atheists find such broadcasts offensive. Nevertheless, it sup-
ports a ban of "language that describes . . . sexual or excretory activities
and organs,"97 because it is determined that such language is "patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium."98 Yet who is to determine those standards? And what
if the seven "filthy words" are used in a context that does not describe
sexual or excretory activities and organs?99 It is a fundamental precept of
constitutional law that a criminal statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbid-
den by the statute, is void for vagueness.' 0 Under that standard, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1970) as construed by the Court in Pacifica should not pass consti-
tutional muster.
94. Id. at 3053 (3rennan, J., dissenting).
95. Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U.L. REv. 834, 857 (1973).
96. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U.L. Rav.
153, 191 (1972). As Mr. Justice Brennan noted, "'[wlords generally considered obscene like
'bull-shit' and 'fuck' are considered neither obscene nor derogatory in the [black] vernacular
except in particular contextual situations and when used with certain intonations.'" (Bins,
Toward an Ethnography of Contemporary African American Oral Poetry, Language and
Linguistics Working Papers No. 5, at 82 (Georgetown University Press 1972)), quoted in, 98
S. Ct. at 3054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
98. Id.
99. As an example, Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out that the phrase, "I'm shit-faced," has
nothing to do with an excretory activity or organ, but means, "I am drunk." 556 F.2d at 23
n.17 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Many other examples may be gleaned from the Carlin
monologue itself.
100. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959); United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the Federal Communications Commission has been
active in controlling the content of broadcast programming. Because much
of this control has consisted of insuring against monopolistic holds by a
particular individual or viewpoint, the FCC has been seen as a benevolent
agency worthy of omnipotence. Enjoying good grace with the public and
judiciary, the Commission has zealously attempted to regulate in the
"public interest." While enforcement of the ban against broadcast obscen-
ity has posed few problems due to the Supreme Court's twenty-year strug-
gle to define that term, the FCC's attempts to prohibit "indecent" speech
has proven intractable. Holding firmly to its belief that "indecent" has a
meaning independent of "obscene," the Commission has attempted to
legislate and enforce a regulation against a classification of speech which,
in all other media, receives constitutional protection. Concededly,
"indecent" language is offensive to the sensibilities of most people and
may even, arguably, be harmful to children. Yet a much greater harm may
be envisaged when we permit a government to prohibit the broadcast of
mere words. As the Court observed in Cohen v. California,' ' "governments
might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views ... ."I" This is the
danger, represented by the Supreme Court's holding in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, against which we must guard.
Robert T. Billingsley
101. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
102. Id. at 26.
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